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INTRODUCTION 
The federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)1 seems 
to be a source of perpetual controversy. Perhaps this is because it 
was enacted in reaction to a previous controversy: the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith, which changed 
the legal landscape of religious claims.2 The Court’s subsequent 
decision in City of Boerne v. Flores did nothing to quell controversy, 
declaring RFRA unconstitutional as applied to the states,3 and 
ignited debates by religious adherents about the need for state 
RFRAs across the country.4 Later, in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita 
Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, RFRA’s weakened status got a boost 
from the Court, which gave greater life to the specificity 
 
1.  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012), invalidated in part by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 
507 (1997). 
 2. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879–80 (1990) (dispelling the strict scrutiny test 
for religious burdens imposed by a “neutral law of general applicability”), superseded by 
statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 3, 107 Stat. 1488, 
1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1). 
 3. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 4. After City of Boerne, twenty-one different states enacted state-level versions of 
RFRA. State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (May 4, 2017), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx. Other 
states continue to pursue state-level versions of RFRA. 2015 State Religious Freedom 
Restoration Legislation, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Sept. 23, 2015), http:// 
www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/2015-state-rfra-legislation.aspx; 2016 
State Religious Freedom Restoration Act Legislation, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES  
(Dec. 31, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/2016-state 
-religious-freedom-restoration-act-legislation.aspx; 2017 State Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act Legislation, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (May 4, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/ 
research/civil-and-criminal-justice/2017-religious-freedom-restoration-act-legislation.aspx. 
Professors Terri R. Day and Danielle Weatherby describe the nature of these “mini RFRAs”: 
  Many of the mini RFRA mimic the federal RFRAs by reinstating strict 
scrutiny review for challenges to government regulations that are alleged to 
substantially burden religious exercise. But other state RFRAs have key provisions 
that extend far beyond their federal parent. For example, some significantly dilute 
the substantial burden requirement (requiring only that the challenged law 
“burdens” or “restricts” religious exercise). Some envision the practice of religion 
to extend to any act or inaction that is tangentially related to a person’s religious 
beliefs. And some even add a “clear and convincing” evidence requirement to 
satisfy strict scrutiny, making the government’s burden of justifying the 
challenged law even more onerous. 
Terri R. Day & Danielle Weatherby, LGBT Rights and the Mini RFRA: A Return to Separate but 
Equal, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 907, 919–20 (2016) (footnotes omitted). 
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requirement of RFRA’s “to the person” language.5 More recently, 
controversy swirled around RFRA’s application to the 
contraceptive mandate of the Affordable Care Act, especially as the 
Court decided Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.6 Scholars have 
criticized the Hobby Lobby decision as interpreting RFRA too 
broadly,7 an interpretation which will inevitably allow religious 
adherents to “impose their religious view of morally correct 
behavior on others[,]”8 “give license to discriminate[,]”9 benefit 
from “an unfair special privilege to ignore the laws everyone else 
must obey[,]”10 and turn the U.S. Code into “Swiss cheese” through 
exemptions.11 On the other hand, scholars have argued that RFRA, 
in practice, is actually under-protecting religious adherents12 and 
that a flood13 of discriminatory RFRA claims simply has not 
 
 5. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,  
430–31 (2006). 
 6. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014). 
 7. Andrew Koppelman & Frederick M. Gedicks, Is Hobby Lobby Worse for Religious 
Liberty than Smith?, 9 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 223, 229 (2015) (asserting Hobby Lobby 
“converted RFRA from the statutory restoration of an even-handed balancing test into a 
doctrinal revolution that has vested in federal judges the authority to craft a wholly new and 
demanding religious exemption jurisprudence”); David B. Schwartz, The NLRA’s Religious 
Exemption in a Post-Hobby Lobby World: Current Status, Future Difficulties, and a Proposed 
Solution, 30 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 227, 235 (2015) (“Hobby Lobby completes the 
transformation of the RFRA into a quasi-constitutional alternative to the Free Exercise 
Clause’s traditional jurisprudence.”). 
 8. Day & Weatherby, supra note 4, at 942. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Stephanie H. Barclay & Mark L. Rienzi, Constitutional Anomalies or As-Applied 
Challenges? A Defense of Religious Exemptions, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1595, 1597 (2018). 
 11. Aram A. Schvey, Much Ado About Nothing? Religious Freedom and the Contraceptive-
Coverage Benefit, 39 HUM. RTS. 11, 12 (2013). 
 12. Luke W. Goodrich & Rachel N. Busick, Sex, Drugs, and Eagle Feathers: An Empirical 
Study of Federal Religious Freedom Cases, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 353, 353 (2018). Professor Ira 
C. Lupu explains lower courts may have a reticence to apply RFRA in full force because 
“[b]ehind every free exercise claim is a spectral march; grant this one, a voice whispers to 
each judge, and you will be confronted with an endless chain of exemption demands from 
religious deviants of every stripe.” Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on 
the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933, 947 (1989) [hereinafter Where Rights Begin]. 
As evidence of this reticence, Lupu argues that lower courts’ interpretation of RFRA has not 
changed, even after the prodding in O Centro. Ira C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious 
Enterprise of Religious Exemptions, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 35, 72 (2015) [hereinafter 
Dubious Enterprise]. 
 13. The majority opinion in Hobby Lobby criticized the minority’s predicted “flood of 
religious objections.” Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 732–33 (2014); see 
also Barclay & Rienzi, supra note 10, at 1606–07; Mary Anne Case, Why “Live-and-Let-Live” Is 
Not a Viable Solution to the Difficult Problems of Religious Accommodation in the Age of Sexual 
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emerged.14 Much of this controversy, past and present, stems from 
inconsistent application of RFRA’s statutory language and the 
Supreme Court’s precedent. It is as if lower courts lost RFRA’s 
blueprint for success: the plain language of the statute. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in O Centro attempted to put 
some of RFRA’s inconsistent application to rest, admonishing 
courts that RFRA’s “to the person” language requires the 
government to focus its compelling interest to “the particular 
claimant.”15 Although some have argued that O Centro did little to 
advance the RFRA cause,16 this Article suggests just the opposite. 
Indeed, this Article’s analysis of post–O Centro cases that discuss 
RFRA’s “to the person” language shows that courts are finally 
focusing on the particular claimant and, thus, returning to RFRA’s 
plain language. This claimant-specific focus has manifested in 
courts’ evaluations of compelling government interests, as in O 
Centro, and has also spurred “to the person” focus on RFRA’s least 
restrictive means requirement. Ultimately, this Article argues that 
a strict application of the “to the person” language to both RFRA’s 
compelling interest and least restrictive means requirements will 
achieve a long-awaited, sustainable religious exemption regime by 
awarding the most narrow exemptions to sincerely burdened 
religious adherents, thereby allowing the otherwise important 
purposes of generally applicable statutes to proceed while 
meaningfully vindicating the religious liberties of minority groups. 
In advancing this thesis, this Article takes the normative 
position that RFRA’s standard is better suited to achieve American 
pluralism than the standard set forth in Smith. RFRA relieves 
governmental burdens upon the free exercise of sincere religious 
adherents, even where the burden is a completely incidental result 
of government action—Smith does not. RFRA reflects the American 
commitment to pluralism and inclusion by granting relief to the 
smallest quantity of sincere religious adherents—usually 
 
Civil Rights, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 463, 487 (2015) (arguing Hobby Lobby “open[ed] up the 
floodgates to a host of new potential claims for religious exemption by a host of different 
kinds of service providers”); Goodrich & Busick, supra note 12, at 353, 355–56, 383–84, 401. 
 14. Goodrich & Busick, supra note 12, at 355–56. 
 15. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,  
430–31 (2006). 
 16. Dubious Enterprise, supra note 12. 
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possessing minority views that get little attention in Congress—
while respecting majoritarian initiatives advanced by that body 
and the executive. However, it should be noted that RFRA is not a 
cure-all approach to every issue of religious freedom.17 Rather, it 
functions as a backdrop, providing religious freedom coverage that 
other statutes fail to provide. 
Part I of this Article discusses RFRA’s historical background, 
touching on legislative history relevant to the “to the person” 
standard, and proceeds to view RFRA in eras of potency of judicial 
application. Part II analyzes RFRA’s textual blueprint: how the “to 
the person” standard fits into the structure of RFRA’s text, takes 
stock of judicial decisions discussing the “to the person” standard, 
and asserts that the post–O Centro “to the person” trend is the most 
principled path toward a sustainable and less controversial RFRA 
jurisprudence. Part III considers how religious claimants, 
government bodies, and judges should act in order to gain from 
strict application of the “to the person” standard. 
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
RFRA’s history is a unique example of how Congress and the 
Supreme Court have interacted in the area of constitutional law. 
Both bodies interpreted the actions of the other as an overreach of 
authority. The current state of RFRA is the product of the reactions 
to that perceived overreach. 
A. Judicial Decisions Prompting Enactment 
Before RFRA, the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause set forth an exemption 
scheme deferential to bona fide religious adherents.18 This scheme 
was characterized by the Court’s decision in Sherbert v. Verner, a 
 
 17. See, e.g., infra note 121 for discussion. 
 18. Additionally, as Dana Schwartzenfeld states, for “many years, the First 
Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause was ‘largely uncontroversial’” with major debates 
revolving “around government support for religion . . . rather than government interference 
with it.” Dana Anne Schwartzenfeld, Note, Let My People Grow: Putting a Number on Strict 
Scrutiny in the Wake of Holt v. Hobbs, 51 GA. L. REV. 297, 301 (2016) (footnote omitted) 
(quoting Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1109, 1109 (1990)). 
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case from 1963 which set out the exemption standard.19 David 
Schwartz, senior counsel to the National Labor Relations Board, 
summarized a court’s process under that standard in two steps by 
considering first, “whether the plaintiff demonstrated that the law 
imposed a substantial burden on the exercise of religion”20 and 
second, “whether there is a ‘compelling state interest’ that 
outweighs ‘the degree of impairment of free exercise rights.’”21 In 
that process, Schwartz stated, “the ‘strict scrutiny’ standard 
requires that any governmental restrictions on fundamental rights 
be the ‘least restrictive alternative’ and ‘narrowly tailored’ to 
achieve the compelling interest. In addition, while the government 
cannot question the validity of an objector’s religious beliefs, it can 
question an objector’s sincerity in seeking an exemption.”22 
However, the Court became “increasingly resistant to 
accommodation claims”23 under the Sherbert standard, leading up 
to its decision in Employment Division v. Smith in 1990. 
Smith changed the legal landscape of the Free Exercise Clause 
by erecting a new standard for religious accommodation and 
exemption claims. Under the Smith standard, burdening a religious 
adherent’s exercise of religion is justified as long as the burden 
results from a “neutral law of general applicability.”24 As such, the 
Smith standard substantially decreased the likelihood of obtaining 
a free exercise accommodation for religious adherents. Merely 
having a burden upon free exercise was not enough. “Religious 
groups, Congress, and even secular civil liberties groups strongly 
opposed”25 the Court’s decision in Smith.26 The byproduct of  
this opposition was Congress’s passage of RFRA,27 a  
 
 19. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 20. Schwartz, supra note 7, at 230. 
 21. Id. (quoting Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403, 406).  
 22. Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. 
v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 755 (1996). 
 23. Charlotte Garden, Religious Employers and Labor Law: Bargaining in Good Faith?, 96 
B.U. L. REV. 109, 124 (2016). 
 24. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 
252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring)). 
 25. Alisa Lalana, Note, RFRA and the Affordable Care Act: Does the Contraception Mandate 
Discriminate Against Religious Employers?, 49 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 661, 666 (2016). 
 26. Barclay & Rienzi, supra note 10, at 1602–04. 
 27. Scott W. Gaylord, RFRA Rights Revisited: Substantial Burdens, Judicial Competence, 
and the Religious Nonprofit Cases, 81 MO. L. REV. 655, 658 (2016). 
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concerted legislative effort to “solidify Sherbert’s substantial-
burden/compelling-interest standard as a statutory right.”28 But 
the text of RFRA went further than simply restoring the Sherbert 
test, instead providing even “greater protection for religious 
exercise than is available under the First Amendment.”29 However, 
this legislative advance “came up against some resistance as to its 
application to the states[,]”30 as is discussed below in section I.C. 
B. Legislative History 
The earliest form of RFRA proposed to Congress, heard first in 
the House of Representatives in 1990, focused its Sherbert-like test 
to a particular religious adherent, as opposed to an entire religious 
group or society at large.31 Indeed, it allowed the government to 
restrict free exercise only where “the governmental authority 
demonstrate[d] that application of the restriction to the person—(A) 
[was] essential to further a compelling governmental interest; and 
(B) [was] the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 
governmental interest.”32 The bill heard months later in the Senate 
was phrased similarly, allowing free exercise restrictions only 
where “the government demonstrate[d] that application of the 
restriction to the person”; the bill tracked the rest of the provision 
introduced in the House.33 The next year, a new House bill slightly 
modified the phrase to become, “Government may burden a 
person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application 
of the burden to the person[,]”34 a modification that was maintained 
in the Senate’s bill a year later.35 The House’s final consideration of 
RFRA36 resulted in the addition of a word into the relevant phrase, 
leaving it, “Government may substantially burden a person’s 
 
 28. Schwartz, supra note 7, at 231. 
 29. Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 859–60 (2015); see also Schwartzenfeld, supra note 18, 
at 303 (“Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) in order to 
enhance the protections provided by the First Amendment.” (footnote omitted)). 
 30. Schwartzenfeld, supra note 18, at 304. 
 31. H.R. 5377, 101st Cong. § 2(b)(2) (1990). 
 32. Id. (emphasis added). 
 33. S. 3254, 101st Cong. § 2(b)(2) (1990) (emphasis added). 
 34. H.R. 2797, 102d Cong. § 3(b) (1991) (emphasis added). 
 35. S. 2969, 102d Cong. § 3(b) (1992). 
 36. H.R. 1308, 103d Cong. § 3(b) (1993). The Senate also made its final consideration of 
RFRA in 1993. S. 578, 103d Cong. § 3(b) (1993). 
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exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the 
burden to the person.”37 This addition is reflected in the presently 
enacted statute.38 Overall, the drafting history shows that RFRA’s 
“to the person” language was contemplated from the beginning, 
put into RFRA’s blueprint, and then deliberately maintained 
throughout the revision processes of the House and Senate.39 
Curiously, in reports to the congressional bodies, neither 
proponents nor opponents of the legislation debated the “to the 
person” language. Rather, the reports show that when discussing 
the subsection containing the “to the person” language, legislators 
and citizens testifying to Congress mainly explained  the 
compelling interest and least restrictive means analysis.40 
Otherwise, the “to the person” language was included when 
reciting the text of the proposed statute.41 Only occasionally was the 
 
 37. H.R. 1308, 103d Cong. § 3(b) (1993) (as amended by Senate, Oct. 27, 1993) 
(emphasis added). 
 38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2012). 
 39. For a compilation of RFRA’s legislative history documents, see  
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (P.L. 103-141), U.S. DEP’T  
JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/jmd/religious-freedom-restoration-act-1993-pl-103-141 
(last updated May 27, 2016). 
 40. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991: Hearings on H.R. 2797 Before the Subcomm. 
on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 10 (1992) 
[hereinafter H. Hearings] (statement of Robert Dugan, Jr., Director, Office of Public Affairs, 
National Association of Evangelicals) (“Section 3(b) of the bill provides that government may 
burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden 
to the person (1) is essential to further a compelling governmental interest and (2) is the least 
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. This provision is 
nothing more than a paraphrase of the Supreme Court’s own compelling interest test since 
discarded. It faithfully reflects the purpose of the bill, which is to restore the compelling 
interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder, and to guarantee its 
application in all cases where free exercise of religion is burdened.”); 139 CONG. REC. 4923 
(1993) (“This section codifies the compelling interest test as the Supreme Court had 
enunciated it and applied it prior to the Smith decision. The bill permits government to 
burden the exercise of religion only if it demonstrates a compelling state interest and that the 
burden in question the [sic] least restrictive means of furthering the interest. It permits 
persons whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of the Act to assert that 
violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and to obtain appropriate relief 
against a government. Standing to assert such a claim or defense is to be governed by the 
general rules of standing under Article III of the Constitution.”); 138 CONG. REC. 18,017–18 
(1992) (“This section codifies the compelling interest test as the Supreme Court had 
enunciated it and applied it prior to the Smith decision. The bill permits government to 
burden the exercise of religion only if it demonstrates a compelling state interest and that the 
burden in question is the least restrictive means of furthering the interest.”). 
 41. H. Hearings, supra note 40, at 19, 273 (1992) (statements of Robert P. Dugan, Jr., 
Director, Office of Public Affairs, National Association of Evangelicals and James Bopp, Jr., 
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“to the person” language mentioned substantively outside these 
categories.42 Perhaps this lack of discussion on the “to the person” 
language was a result of the debate’s preoccupation with RFRA’s 
potential clash with existing abortion law.43 
Whatever the cause for little mention of the “to the person” 
language, RFRA successfully passed through Congress, with the 
Senate voting to pass the bill ninety-seven to three.44 President Bill 
Clinton signed RFRA into law on November 16, 1993.45 
C. Pre–City of Boerne46 
RFRA remained in full force for about three and a half years 
until the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Boerne v. Flores.47 
 
 
General Counsel, National Right to Life Committee, Inc.); The Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act: Hearing on S. 2969 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 160, 209 (1992) 
[hereinafter S. Hearings] (statements of Coalitions for America and James Bopp, Jr., General 
Counsel, National Right to Life Committee, Inc.); S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 3, 27 (1993). 
 42. During one of the debates, Henry Hyde, a Congressman from Illinois, discussed 
the issue of abortion while including the “to the person” language 
Government may burden a person’s exercise of religion only, and the claim is 
made my religion requires me to exterminate my unborn child, or, to use  
the preferred phrase, terminate the pregnancy, only if it demonstrates that 
application of the burden to the person is essential to further a compelling  
governmental interest. 
H. Hearings, supra note 40, at 50 (statement of Henry Hyde, Rep. from Illinois). Professor 
Lupu’s address critiqued the entire framework of RFRA, mentioning the “to the person” 
language: “The requirements that the government’s choice of means, as applied to the person 
claiming a religious burden, be both ‘essential to’ and the ‘least restrictive means of 
furthering’ a compelling interest will be extremely difficult for government to meet.” Id. at 
381 (statement of Professor Ira C. Lupu). 
 43. H.R. REP. NO. 103-88, at 8 (1993) (“There has been much debate about this bill’s 
relevance to the issue of abortion.”); S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 12 (1993) (“There has been much 
debate about this act’s relevance to the issue of abortion.”); see generally H. Hearings, supra 
note 40; S. Hearings, supra note 41. 
 44. Roll Call Vote 103rd Congress - 1st Session, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate 
.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=103&session=1&vote
=00331 (last visited Apr. 8, 2019). 
 45. Peter Steinfels, Clinton Signs Law Protecting Religious Practices, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 
1993), http://www.nytimes.com/1993/11/17/us/clinton-signs-law-protecting-religious 
-practices.html. 
 46. This Article draws upon the same periods of RFRA potency Professor Lupu has 
previously defined. See Dubious Enterprise, supra note 12, at 57–67. 
 47. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
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During that time period, RFRA’s potential power was at its zenith, 
applying to all law in the United States, state or federal.48 This 
period generated a fairly significant amount of litigation: 168 
decisions, predominantly rendered in federal courts.49 However, 
even during RFRA’s season of peak strength, religious adherents 
prevailed in only fifteen percent of cases heard on their merits,  
with thirty-six percent of those wins attributed to prisoners whose  
cases “typically involved the most basic infringements of  
religious liberty.”50 
During this period, local zoning authorities in the city of 
Boerne, Texas, denied a request from the Catholic Archbishop of 
San Antonio to enlarge St. Peter Catholic Church to accommodate 
its growing congregation.51 After the Archbishop challenged the 
denial as a violation of RFRA,52 the resulting case, City of Boerne v. 
Flores, found its way to the Supreme Court, where the Court held 
that Congress exceeded the bounds of its power under the 
Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by applying 
RFRA to the states.53 The Court’s decision stripped RFRA of much 
of its reach, limiting its application to the federal government.54 
 
 48. Dubious Enterprise, supra note 12, at 58. 
 49. Ira C. Lupu, The Failure of RFRA, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 575, 591 (1998). 
 50. Id. 
 51. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 511. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 536. 
 54. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(1) (2012) (“[T]he term ‘government’ includes a branch, 
department, agency, instrumentality, and official (or other person acting under color of law) 
of the United States, or of a covered entity.”). On October 6, 2017, the United States Attorney 
General issued a memorandum with guidance for the executive branch’s compliance with 
religious liberty duties. The memorandum clarifies that all federal actors must be compliant, 
not just high-level officials, noting that “[i]n particular, agencies should remember that RFRA 
applies to agency enforcement just as it applies to every other governmental action” and 
provides guidance specific to agencies as employers, as rule makers, as enforcers, as 
contractors, and as grant distributors. Federal Law Protections for Religious Liberty, 82 Fed. 
Reg. 49670–71 (Oct. 26, 2017). 
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D. Post–City of Boerne and Pre–O Centro 
City of Boerne spurred legislative action in both Congress55 and 
state legislatures56 that aimed to accomplish the same or similar 
task of RFRA in the state context. While some of those measures 
were successful, this period may be regarded as RFRA’s darkest 
days, stretching from 1997 to 2006. Professor Ira C. Lupu calls 
RFRA during this period “persistently weak”; argues that it 
indicated a “gaping chasm between RFRA’s promise, as reflected 
in its stringent statutory formula, and RFRA’s performance”; and 
notes that in all RFRA cases in the federal courts of appeal, religious 
adherents never once prevailed.57 These cases were characterized 
by court resolution on the substantial burden and compelling 
government interest portions of RFRA’s test.58 In many ways, 
during this period, RFRA appeared to be “all but dead”59 language 
in the federal code, a forgotten failure of religious liberty 
protection. But new life was just around the corner. 
E. Post–O Centro to the Present 
Hoasca tea was the remedy for RFRA’s comatose state. Indeed, 
Hoasca, a sacramental tea brewed from plants unique to the 
Brazilian Amazon60 prohibited by the Controlled Substances Act, 
was the center of Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do 
Vegetal,61 the case that gave RFRA new life. There, the Supreme 
Court gave special, even surprising, weight to RFRA’s “to the 
 
 55. Two bills were considered in the House of Representatives, advocating for a 
“Religious Liberty Protection Act.” H.R. 1691, 106th Cong. (as referred to S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, July 16, 1999); H.R. 4019, 105th Cong. (1998). However, neither was successful. But 
a bill providing a much narrower set of protections was: the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2012). Many RLUIPA cases 
incorporate RFRA’s “to the person” standard. 
 56. All but two of the states to enact a state RFRA, Kentucky and Pennsylvania, 
maintained the “to the person” language in their own statutes. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.350 
(LexisNexis Supp. 2017); 71 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2404 (West 2012); State 
Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, supra note 4. 
 57. Dubious Enterprise, supra note 12, at 60–61. 
 58. Id. at 61 n.118. 
 59. Lupu, supra note 49, at 575. 
 60. Hoasca Tea, CENTRO ESPÍRITA BENEFICENTE UNIÃO DO VEGETAL U.S., 
http://udvusa.org/hoasca-tea/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2019). 
 61. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,  
423 (2006). 
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person” language, requiring the government to focus its analysis 
on a small group of religious adherents belonging to the “Centro 
Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal” (UDV) who drank hoasca 
tea as an essential part of their faith.62 Specifically, the Court 
rejected what the government had asserted as a compelling 
governmental interest—uniform enforcement of the Controlled 
Substances Act—terming it a “categorical approach” with “broadly 
formulated interests” and “general characteristics.”63 The Court 
continued, explaining, “RFRA requires the Government to 
demonstrate that the compelling interest test is satisfied through 
application of the challenged law ‘to the person’—the particular 
claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially 
burdened.”64 Thus, the Court examined the government’s interest 
under “the more focused inquiry required by RFRA,” which, 
through the “to the person” standard, required the government to 
“consider[] the harms posed by the particular use at issue [in O 
Centro]—the circumscribed, sacramental use of hoasca by the 
UDV”65 and its 130 members.66 Although the Court noted that 
RFRA does not foreclose the ability of the government to 
“demonstrate a compelling interest in uniform application of a 
particular program by offering evidence that granting the 
requested religious accommodations would seriously compromise 
its ability to administer the program[,]”67 it held that the 
government could not show the UDV’s use of hoasca seriously 
compromised its ability to administer the Controlled Substances 
Act.68 Notably, the Court did not apply the “to the person” 
language to the least restrictive means prong of RFRA, deciding the 
 
 62. Id. at 430–33. 
 63. Id. at 430–32. 
 64. Id. at 430–31. 
 65. Id. at 432. 
 66. Id. at 425. Since 2006, UDV’s membership has grown to 270 individuals. People of 
the União, CENTRO ESPÍRITA BENEFICENTE UNIÃO DO VEGETAL U.S., http://udvusa.org 
/people-of-the-uniao/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2019). 
 67. O Centro, 546 U.S. at 435. 
 68. Id. at 432 (“Congress’ determination that [hoasca] should be listed under Schedule 
I simply does not provide a categorical answer that relieves the Government of the obligation 
to shoulder its burden under RFRA.”); id. at 439 (“[W]e conclude that the courts below did 
not err in determining that the Government failed to demonstrate, at the preliminary 
injunction stage, a compelling interest in barring the UDV’s sacramental use of hoasca.”). 
 
001.BEAN_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/15/19  1:56 PM 
1 "To the Person”: RFRA’s Blueprint 
 13 
case solely on the failure of the government to show a focused 
compelling interest. 
O Centro has been termed a “surprisingly strong interpretation 
of RFRA,”69 not because the Supreme Court was giving RFRA new 
strength from outside the statute, but because the interpretation in 
O Centro returned to the plain meaning of the “to the person” 
language already contained in RFRA’s blueprint, suggesting “the 
possibility that RFRA’s original promise might actually be 
realized.”70 The strength of O Centro’s interpretation is underscored 
by the fact that it was a unanimous opinion—not even the justices 
typically hostile to religion claims voiced dissent.71  
After the Court’s admonition to interpret the “to the person” 
language at a high level of specificity, many courts started 
enforcing other sections of RFRA’s test with more force to cut down 
RFRA claims and dodge the “to the person” analysis altogether.72 
But the courts that have taken the “to the person” language head 
on seem to have taken O Centro seriously.  
II. JUDICIAL USE OF THE “TO THE PERSON” STANDARD 
In order to measure whether courts are more faithfully 
adhering to focused analysis of RFRA’s “to the person” language 
after O Centro, this Article turns to empirical data. But, first, this 
Article looks to a plain language reading of RFRA’s “to the person” 
text, outlining what should be courts’ primary consideration when 
engaging in statutory interpretation.   
A. Textual Interpretation of “To the Person” 
The structure of RFRA’s text and where the “to the person” 
language falls within it provides the best, and most obvious, 
 
 69. Dubious Enterprise, supra note 12, at 62. 
 70. Id. 
 71. O Centro, 546 U.S. at 422 (“Roberts, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which 
all other Members joined, except Alito, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision 
of the case.”). 
 72. Dubious Enterprise, supra note 12, at 63. This sort of interpretive move, often made 
on RFRA’s requirement that the religious adherent’s religious exercise be substantially 
burdened, could have been employed by courts from the advent of RFRA. Indeed, the 
substantial burden requirement remains a threshold for RFRA claims that lower courts 
arguably continue to expand and contract. 
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structural clue about how the “to the person” language should be 
interpreted. RFRA’s text appears as follows: 
(a) In general 
Government shall not substantially burden a person’s 
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of 
general applicability, except as provided in subsection (b) of 
this section. 
(b) Exception 
Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of 
religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden 
to the person— 
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental 
interest; and 
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that 
compelling governmental interest. 
(c) Judicial relief 
A person whose religious exercise has been burdened in 
violation of this section may assert that violation as a claim or 
defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief 
against a government. Standing to assert a claim or defense 
under this section shall be governed by the general rules of 
standing under article III of the Constitution.73 
Under inspection in this Article is subsection (b). However, as 
discussed below, subsection (a), requiring a religious adherent to 
make a showing that a government action substantially burdens the 
religious adherent’s exercise of religion, operates as an effective 
gatekeeper in the courts, screening out both insincere claimants and 
sincere claimants who are not truly burdened.74 
 
 73. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 74. See Gaylord, supra note 27, at 691 (explaining “the substantiality of a burden is 
determined by the level of force the government applies to get a religious believer to 
contravene his religious beliefs, not a court’s independent determination that a law’s 
requirements are or are not actually consistent with his professed religious beliefs” and 
discussing substantial burden analysis in the context of religious nonprofit organizations); 
see also Lupu, supra note 49, at 594 (noting that “judges seeking to limit exemptions will be 
inclined to rely upon the ‘burden’ requirement as the primary obstacle to RFRA claimants” 
and that “[j]udges have used a variety of interpretive moves to disqualify RFRA claims on 
the grounds of insufficient burden on religion”). 
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It is easy to see that the “to the person” language within 
subsection (b) is placed previous to, and separate from, subsections 
(b)(1) and (b)(2) below it. Thus, visually, it sits above the compelling 
interest and least restrictive means tests. This placement, together 
with the punctuation of the subsection’s sentence, indicates that the 
“to the person” language is (1) a court’s first concern under the 
subsection, and (2) that the language applies to both the compelling 
interest and least restrictive means tests. In other words, RFRA’s 
subsection (b) really entails three steps: (1) recognition of the 
religious plaintiff as the “particular claimant”75 at issue, (2) 
evidence that the government has a compelling interest specific to 
the plaintiff, and (3) evidence that the government’s choice of 
furthering that specific compelling interest is the least restrictive 
means for that plaintiff. This conclusion, reinforced by O Centro, 
provides straightforward guidance for the application of RFRA. 
Below, this Article surveys the success of this conclusion in  
the courts. 
B. Methodology 
To track courts’ use of the “to the person” standard after O 
Centro, this Article analyzes two data sets: (1) all federal court of 
appeals decisions citing RFRA, and (2) all federal decisions, 
including district courts, where the “to the person” language was a 
significant consideration.76 Although not as robust as some 
 
 75. O Centro, 546 U.S. at 430–31; see also Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. R.G. &. 
G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 590 (6th Cir. 2018) (terming this step “the ‘to 
the person’ test”). It should be noted that while this Article often refers to “particular 
claimants” as plaintiffs and discusses plaintiff-level specificity, RFRA may also be asserted by 
defendants as a defense to government action taken against them. Thus, plaintiff-level 
specificity is interchangeable with defendant-level specificity. 
 76. These data sets were chosen to provide different lenses through which to view 
judicial treatment of RFRA, and more specifically, the use of the “to the person” language in 
RFRA analysis. The first data set, analyzing federal courts of appeal decisions citing RFRA, 
was chosen to provide a picture of high-level appellate decisions more likely to engage in 
merits discussions of RFRA than their district court counterparts. This was done in an effort 
to gauge the frequency of substantial analyses of the “to the person” language as opposed to 
other RFRA-related analyses. 
  The second data set, analyzing all federal decisions, including district courts, where 
the “to the person” language was a significant consideration, was chosen as an issue-specific 
examination of how federal courts analyze the “to the person” language of RFRA, as opposed 
to how frequently they do so. In an effort to provide as much qualitative data to this issue-
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empirical studies, this Article’s resulting data set was achieved by 
modeling empirical analysis.77 
The first data set was obtained by viewing Westlaw’s citing 
references to RFRA, specifically Section 2000bb-1. The 1,353 results 
were narrowed to 815 reported federal decisions. By eliminating 
federal district court, bankruptcy court, and specialty court 
decisions, 306 cases remained, which, when duplicate results were 
removed and only cases occurring after February 21, 2006 (the date 
of the O Centro decision) were considered, reduced to 118 
decisions.78 These decisions were individually reviewed for their 
RFRA treatment. 
The second data set was obtained by searching Westlaw’s 
federal cases database for: ”‘RFRA’ & ‘to the person’ & 
‘compelling’.” The resulting case bank is composed of 696 cases. 
These results were further narrowed to 192 cases by excluding 
unreported decisions, decisions entered previous to O Centro, and 
bankruptcy and specialty court decisions. These 192 cases were 
reviewed for a discussion of RFRA’s “to the person” standard that 
went beyond a simple recitation of the language from the statute.79 
In the end, fifty-nine decisions contained substantive discussions of 
the “to the person” language.80  
C. Prevalence of “To the Person” Analysis in Federal Appellate Courts 
The first data set shows the frequency with which federal 
appellate courts reach RFRA’s “to the person” language after O 
Centro. Decisions were sorted into four categories: (1) those with a 
significant discussion of the “to the person” language, even if 
 
specific examination, district court cases were also included. By including district court cases, 
this second data set was also useful as a tool to view the rates of different types of “to the 
person” engagement at the district and appellate levels of review. 
  Overall, federal courts, as opposed to state courts, were chosen for analysis because 
RFRA is a federal statute, and therefore a federal question frequently engaged in the federal 
court system. An empirical analysis of state courts’ interpretation of RFRA’s “to the person” 
standard would also be an interesting and useful data set. 
 77. Cf. Barclay & Rienzi, supra note 10, at 1633–39; Goodrich & Busick, supra note 12, 
at 357–62. 
 78. See infra Appendix A. 
 79. Where cases were resolved on RFRA’s threshold substantial burden test, but a 
court proceeded in the alternative to analyze the “to the person” standard in some depth, 
those cases were deemed to include a substantive discussion of the “to the person” language. 
 80. See infra Appendix B. 
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discussed as an alternative holding (TTP); (2) those that referenced 
RFRA to lend interpretive power or historical context to a Religious 
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act claim (RLUIPA); (3) 
those that dispensed with a RFRA claim on non-to-the-person 
considerations, like standing, jurisdiction, or RFRA’s relationship 
with sovereign immunity and money damages, or involved a state 
RFRA (Non-TTP); and (4) those that were resolved on the 
substantial burden prong of RFRA (Sub. Burden). Several cases 
included discussions falling into more than one category. Table 1 
depicts this categorization. 
  
001.BEAN_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/15/19 1:56 PM 




001.BEAN_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/15/19 1:56 PM 
1 "To the Person”: RFRA’s Blueprint 
19 
This data reveals some interesting findings. It suggests that 
RFRA cases, even at the appellate level, are being considered at all 
stages of the RFRA test in the post–O Centro era; they are not all 
being shut out on RFRA’s substantial burden threshold. 
First, just under half of all RFRA claims are resolved without 
touching on either of RFRA’s prongs—by definitional, justiciability, 
or applicability analysis. In other words, these claims fail before 
reaching RFRA’s substantial burden threshold. Second, fifteen 
percent of decisions citing RFRA do not apply it at all—RLUIPA 
decisions—which usually reference RFRA in a passing description 
of RLUIPA’s genesis or analogize to RFRA’s constitutionally 
derived burdens. 
Third, roughly a quarter of RFRA decisions are made on the 
substantial burden prong of RFRA. Yet, those decisions occur just 
as often as decisions made on RFRA’s “to the person” prong, in 
conjunction with the compelling interest and least restrictive means 
considerations. In the end, the data shows that, at most, only 
twenty-eight claims survived in the appellate sphere to be 
evaluated in RFRA’s final, “to the person” consideration. And 
many of those evaluations denied religious exemptions at the  
last step. 
D. Judicial Analysis of “To the Person” in All Federal Courts 
The second data set provides more qualitative context to federal 
judicial treatment of RFRA. Here, decisions, including federal 
district court decisions, were sorted into categories according to 
their method of employing the “to the person” analysis: (1) 
description and/or application of the “to the person” language to 
compelling interest analysis (TTP w/ CI Only), and (2) description 
and/or application of the “to the person” language to both the 
compelling interest and least restrictive means analyses (TTP w/ CI 
& LRM). Table 2 depicts this categorization on the right side of the 
black line. On the left side of the black line, Table 2 compares  
the frequency of “to the person” analysis in federal district courts 
(D. Ct. TTP) with federal appellate courts (App. TTP) in the  
same jurisdiction. 
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As Table 2 shows, federal appellate courts do not reach the “to 
the person” language with the same frequency as the federal 
district courts below them, although the Ninth and Eleventh 
Circuits buck that trend. This is not too surprising—many RFRA 
cases are resolved at the district court level. But what is most 
interesting is that Table 2 shows most federal courts considering the 
“to the person” language apply it to both the compelling interest 
and least restrictive means portions of RFRA’s second prong. While 
the Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have lower frequencies of 
fully engaging the “to the person” language, the First, Eighth, and 
Ninth Circuits, as well as the U.S. Supreme Court, have fully 
engaged the “to the person” language every time those courts reach 
that step of RFRA’s test. Overall, the “to the person” analysis has 
been applied to both the compelling interest and least restrictive 
means considerations at a rate of sixty-eight percent. 
This last finding is of particular interest because O Centro itself 
only explicitly reinforced the “to the person” language’s plaintiff-
level specificity as to the compelling interest consideration.81 In 
other words, if O Centro were the sole driving force behind plaintiff-
level specificity, one would expect the TTP w/ CI Only percentage 
to be much higher. However, some courts have drawn from Free 
Exercise Clause interpretation to particularize RFRA’s least 
restrictive means requirement in a similar, plaintiff-specific way. 
As an example, in Legatus v. Sebelius,82 a federal district court in 
Michigan used a plaintiff-specific definition of least restrictive 
means from South Ridge Baptist Church v. Industrial Commission of 
Ohio,83 a free exercise and establishment case. The quoted definition 
from South Ridge Baptist Church explained the least restrictive 
means to be “the extent to which accommodation of the [plaintiff] 
would impede the state’s objectives.”84 After using this definition, 
the district court proceeded to evaluate the least restrictive means 
as “to the person” of Legatus—not just the least restrictive means 
 
 81. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 439 
(2006) (declining to address the State’s least restrictive means argument for failure to show 
particularized compelling interest). 
 82. Legatus v. Sebelius, 988 F. Supp. 2d 794, 810–13 (E.D. Mich. 2013). 
 83. S. Ridge Baptist Church v. Indus. Comm’n, 911 F.2d 1203 (6th Cir. 1990). 
 84. Legatus, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 810 (quoting S. Ridge Baptist Church, 911 F.2d at 1206).  
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of accomplishing the government’s compelling interest as to 
Roman Catholics or the general body of Americans.85 
Other courts have created plaintiff-level specificity by 
collapsing subsection (b)’s two requirements to consider whether 
“application of the burden to the person . . . is the least restrictive 
means of furthering [a] compelling government interest.”86 Perhaps 
this is because, for some courts, the “distinction between the two 
[considerations] is not always clear.”87 
However, a much simpler, O Centro–type move to create 
plaintiff-level specificity is found in the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Hobby Lobby. There, the Court, in its explanation of least 
restrictive means, emphasized RFRA’s “to the person” language: 
“See §§ 2000bb–1(a), (b) (requiring the Government to 
‘demonstrat[e] that application of [a substantial] burden to the 
person . . . is the least restrictive means of furthering [a] compelling 
governmental interest’ (emphasis added)).”88 By doing this, the 
Court emphasized what should have been obvious from RFRA’s 
text: the “to the person” language applies in equal and separate 
measure to the least restrictive means analysis.89 The surrounding 
text makes the Court’s plaintiff-level emphasis for the least 
restrictive means requirement the most clear. The Court stated, 
“HHS has not shown that it lacks other means of achieving its 
desired goal without imposing a substantial burden on the exercise 
of religion by the objecting parties in these cases.”90 This passage 
has had the largest effect in creating plaintiff-level specificity on the 
least restrictive means consideration. Indeed, various cases cite 
Hobby Lobby for this proposition.91 In many ways, Hobby Lobby  
 
 85. Id. at 810–13. 
 86. Franciscan All., Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d 660, 691 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (quoting 
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2012)); see also La. Coll. v. Sebelius, 38 F. Supp. 3d 766, 786 (W.D. La. 
2014); Colo. Christian Univ. v. Sebelius, 51 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1063 (D. Colo. 2014). 
 87. N. Arapaho Tribe v. Ashe, 92 F. Supp. 3d 1160, 1188–89 (D. Wyo. 2015). 
 88. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 728 (2014). 
 89. Other courts have followed a similar approach, simply emphasizing the obvious 
language of RFRA. See United States v. Anderson, 854 F.3d 1033, 1036–37 (8th Cir. 2017); 
United States v. Christie, 825 F.3d 1048, 1063 (9th Cir. 2016); Equal Emp’t Opportunity 
Comm’n v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 837, 841 (E.D.  
Mich. 2016). 
 90. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 728. 
 91. See, e.g., Eternal Word Television Network, Inc. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., 818 F.3d 1122, 1158 (11th Cir. 2016); Singh v. McHugh, 185 F. Supp. 3d 201, 
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has done for least restrictive means what O Centro did for 
compelling interest. 
Whatever the method for adopting this plaintiff-specific 
approach, what O Centro left unfinished—the reemphasis of the “to 
the person” language’s application to the least restrictive means 
test—is now being completed. 
E. O Centro’s Success: Diminishing the “Swiss Cheese” Problem 
Even though RFRA’s textual blueprint plainly shows that the 
“to the person” specificity requirement applies to both the 
compelling interest and least restrictive means portions of RFRA, 
full judicial application of the “to the person” standard is a recent 
event. It looks like RFRA’s original promise might finally be 
realized.92 Some, however, feel this original promise is a threat to 
the ordered administration of justice, undermining generally 
applicable laws,93 allowing religious adherents to become a law 
unto themselves,94 and creating a metaphorical “Swiss cheese” 
legal system with gaping holes created by exemptions.95 This fear 
is overstated. While RFRA does in fact grant religious adherents 
exemptions, its statutory burdens ensure these exemptions do not 
thwart the purpose behind generally applicable laws. Indeed, the 
strengthening of RFRA’s “to the person” language—through O 
Centro, Hobby Lobby, and other cases—only makes RFRA’s 
exemption framework more sustainable. 
 
230 (D.D.C. 2016); Armstrong v. Jewell, 151 F. Supp. 3d 242, 249 (D.R.I. 2015); March for Life 
v. Burwell, 128 F. Supp. 3d 116, 131 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229, 264 (D.C. Cir. 2014)); United States v. Epstein, 91 F. 
Supp. 3d 573, 586 (D.N.J. 2015). 
 92. Dubious Enterprise, supra note 12, at 62. 
 93. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 739–72 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 94. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (“[T]o say that a nondiscriminatory 
religious-practice exemption is permitted, or even that it is desirable, is not to say that it is 
constitutionally required, and that the appropriate occasions for its creation can be discerned 
by the courts. It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process will 
place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but 
that unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be preferred to a system in 
which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social importance of 
all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs.”). 
 95. Schvey, supra note 11, at 12. 
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But how can this be? Does not the strengthening of the “to the 
person” language only work to the benefit of religious adherents? 
The answer to these questions, of course, is in the cases. 
First, recent studies have shown that exemptions resulting from 
RFRA are not punching holes in legislative frameworks at an 
alarming rate. In Professor Goodrich and Ms. Busick’s analysis of 
Tenth Circuit religious freedom cases, they observed that the 
number of RFRA claims was quite small—only thirty-one in ten 
years.96 And these cases appear to be mostly confined to narrow 
scenarios: challenges of the Affordable Care Act’s contraceptive 
mandate, Native American religious practices, and drug schemes.97 
Only forty-eight percent of those cases resulted in an exemption, all 
a product of the Affordable Care Act’s contraceptive mandate,98 
which Goodrich and Busick argue is an anomalous source of RFRA 
cases anyway.99 Without the anomalous contraceptive mandate 
cases, RFRA, in the Tenth Circuit, left legislative schemes 
untouched.100 Thus, while RFRA’s framework allows, in theory, for 
the granting of various religious exemptions from generally 
applicable laws, in practice, very few are granted.  
Second, the exemptions that are granted by RFRA are carefully 
narrowed by RFRA’s statutory burdens: the substantial burden test 
and, of particular interest here, the “to the person” standard’s 
application to both the compelling interest and least restrictive 
means requirements. In other words, RFRA makes sure that any 
holes that are created in the “Swiss cheese” are small101 and do not 
 
 96. Goodrich & Busick, supra note 12, at 363–66. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 382. 
 99. Id. at 366. 
 100. Id. at 382. Goodrich and Busick argue that although the Tenth Circuit is not 
perfectly representative of all federal courts across the nation, it is uniquely situated to be 
predictive of the future of religious liberty litigation because (1) it was the pipeline for some 
of the most influential religious liberty decisions in recent years, such as Hobby Lobby and 
Little Sisters of the Poor, (2) the balance of its Republican- and Democrat-appointed judges 
hovers near fifty-fifty, (3) its reversal rate falls near the federal circuit average, and (4) the 
religious demographic of the Tenth Circuit is almost exactly the same as the nation as a 
whole. Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016); Goodrich & Busick, supra note 12, at 356. 
 101. Interestingly, the United States Department of Agriculture has actually regulated 
the size of holes in Swiss cheese, taking the “eyes” in the cheese from the size of a nickel to 
the size of a dime. Bob Faw & John Seigenthaler, The Hole Story: USDA Regulates Size of Holes 
in Swiss Cheese, NBC NIGHTLY NEWS (Aug. 8, 2000), https://archives.nbclearn.com 
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impair its flavor—what the law was intended to accomplish.102 The 
substantial burden test ensures that disingenuous and insubstantial 
RFRA claims never result in an exemption. The “to the person” 
language shrinks the possible exemption to an identifiable 
individual or group of individuals. Applied to the compelling 
interest test, the “to the person” standard requires the government 
to explore the diameter of such a narrow exemption. The 
government must show it has a compelling interest in closing the 
pinpoint sized hole created by an individual or group’s 
noncompliance. And if the government has a plaintiff-specific 
compelling interest, the “to the person” language, working in 
tandem with the least restrictive means requirement, requires the 
government to show that closing the hole is the only way to 
maintain the flavor of the legislative cheese. RFRA assures religious 
exemptions do not consume generally applicable laws; it keeps our 
cheese flavorful. 
After the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby, many 
have argued that the Court’s interpretation of the word “person” 
as used in RFRA to cover closely-held, for-profit corporations103 
will expand holes in the Swiss cheese, creating large exemptions for 
vast numbers of people.104 Hobby Lobby, Inc., for example, 
employs roughly 37,500 employees.105 Hobby Lobby’s RFRA 
exemption thus created a hole in the Affordable Care Act cheese. 
 
/portal/site/k-12/flatview?cuecard=51917; see also Kitchen Daily, Why Does Swiss Cheese 
Have Holes?, HUFFPOST (Apr. 17, 2012, 6:04 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com 
/2012/04/17/holes-in-swiss-cheese_n_1428707.html. 
 102. Professor Garden has addressed RFRA’s narrow exceptions regime in the 
employment context. See Garden, supra note 23, at 157 (“[T]he interests of all concerned are 
served when accommodations are as narrow as possible, particularly if they burden third 
parties. Of course, narrow accommodations minimize encroachments on employees’ 
interests. But, perhaps counterintuitively, religious employers are also better off when RFRA 
accommodations are narrow.”). 
 103. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 708 (2014). “Person” has been 
deemed to include non-profit corporations as well. Id. 
 104. See Federal Law Protections for Religious Liberty, 82 Fed. Reg. 49669 (Oct. 26, 2017) 
(interpreting “person” to apply to individuals, corporations, companies, associations, firms, 
partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies); Rachel Alexander, The Constitutional 
Theory of Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 175 L. & JUST. 209, 212 (2015); Dubious Enterprise, supra 
note 12, at 78–80; Garden, supra note 23, at 139–40; Koppelman & Gedicks, supra note 7,  
at 224. 
 105. Our Story, HOBBY LOBBY, https://www.hobbylobby.com/about-us/our-story 
(last visited Apr. 19, 2019). 
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But even that hole is tiny, amounting to only 0.002% of the 
American workforce.106 To say that expansion of “person” to cover 
corporate entities with religious identity will allow RFRA to hollow 
out legislation is an overstatement.107 
This conclusion is emphasized by the far more typical type of 
prevailing RFRA litigant: individuals or small religious 
organizations. Take, for example, Robert Soto, a Native American 
pastor, and his congregation;108 Kawal Tagore, a Sikh employee of 
the IRS ousted from her job;109 or the Irshad Learning Center, a 
Muslim community group.110 
Often enough, however, RFRA is applied to preclude any 
exemption, however miniscule, in cases where the government 
meets its burdens under the “to the person” standard. The 
government’s ability to administrate an absolute ban on controlled 
substances serves as a good example. In O Centro, as stated above, 
the Supreme Court granted an exemption to the Controlled 
Substances Act, allowing a small sect to drink hallucinogenic tea.111 
In doing so, the Court articulated that its decision should not be 
interpreted to mean it would be impossible for the government to 
enforce an absolute ban on some controlled substances.112 The 
Court stated it was possible that “the Government can demonstrate 
a compelling interest in uniform application of a particular 
program by offering evidence that granting the requested religious 
 
 106. Chuck Vollmer, 2016 State of the U.S. Labor Force, JOBENOMICS (Jan. 12, 2016), 
https://jobenomicsblog.com/2016-state-of-the-u-s-labor-force/ (explaining Bureau of 
Labor Statistics from 2016 which estimate 157,833,000, or forty-nine percent, of Americans 
belong to the “Civilian Labor Force”). 
 107. See generally Goodrich & Busick, supra note 12. 
 108. McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Salazar, 764 F.3d 465 (5th Cir. 2014);  
Settlement Agreement, McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Jewell, No. 7:07-cv-060 (S.D. Tex. 
June 13, 2016), https://s3.amazonaws.com/becketpdf/Exhibit-1-Settlement-Agreement 
-file-stamped.pdf. 
 109. Tagore v. United States, 735 F.3d 324 (5th Cir. 2013); Order Granting Motion for 
Authorization to Enter, Tagore v. United States, No. H-09-0027 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 15, 2014), 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/becketpdf/Court-Order_Tagore.pdf. 
 110. Irshad Learning Ctr. v. County of DuPage, 804 F. Supp. 2d 697 (N.D. Ill. 2011). 
 111. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,  
439 (2006). 
 112. Id. at 435. 
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accommodations would seriously compromise its ability to 
administer the program.”113 
The government has managed to make such a demonstration in 
several cases. In United States v. Christie,114 the government 
successfully showed that plaintiffs’ “unbending compliance” with 
the Controlled Substances Act was the least restrictive means of 
advancing a compelling government interest: preventing 
distribution of cannabis to recreational users.115 There, the Ninth 
Circuit explained, 
 [t]he record in this case succeeds where the record in O Centro 
fell short because . . . in this case there is specific evidence that the 
[plaintiffs’] distribution methods created a realistic possibility 
that cannabis intended for members of the [plaintiffs’ church] 
would be distributed instead to outsiders who were merely 
feigning membership in the [church] and adherence to its 
religious tenets.116 
A religious exemption for marijuana use and distribution was 
similarly foreclosed by the government’s showing of a 
particularized compelling interest and least restrictive means in 
Armstrong v. Jewell,117 where the Rhode Island Federal District 
Court “acknowledge[d] the overwhelming difference between 
marijuana . . . and other substances, which are used by religious 
organizations in tightly circumscribed ceremonies.”118 The 
government has successfully availed itself of this reasoning in cases 
outside of the Controlled Substances Act—for example, complete 
bans on the crime of kidnapping,119 the application of uniform 
terms of supervision for probationers,120 Title VII’s non-
discrimination requirements,121 and the restriction of inmates’ 
 
 113. Id. 
 114. United States v. Christie, 825 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 115. Id. at 1056–57. 
 116. Id. at 1057. 
 117. Armstrong v. Jewell, 151 F. Supp. 3d 242, 251 (D.R.I. 2015). 
 118. Id. at 252. 
 119. United States v. Epstein, 91 F. Supp. 3d 573, 583–87 (D.N.J. 2015). 
 120. United States v. Lafley, 656 F.3d 936, 940–42 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 121. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. R.G. &. G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 
F.3d 560, 595 (6th Cir. 2018). Although this Article is focused on the application of Federal 
RFRA, it is important to note that for state RFRAs, one area similar to Title VII that has 
resulted in almost no exemptions is where religious adherents invoke a state RFRA in order 
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access to alcohol.122 Although these cases involved small groups, or 
even individuals, whose resulting religious exemption would have 
been a microscopic hole in the relevant legislation, the government 
was still able to prevail. 
These considerations show that RFRA’s statutory burdens, 
when appropriately considered through the lens of the plaintiff-
specific “to the person” standard, produce the smallest religious 
exemptions possible. RFRA, properly applied, will not gut 
legislative frameworks. Rather, it is a statutory method of balancing 
important rights in a pluralistic society. It protects religious 
claimants from substantial burdens on the free exercise of their 
religion through tiny exemptions while permitting the overall 
advancement of the government’s stated goals in the enforcement 
of otherwise beneficial legislation. 
 
to obtain an exemption from a state non-discrimination law which includes sexual 
orientation and/or gender identity as a protected class. Courts have uniformly, with only 
one exception, held that non-discrimination is a compelling interest and that there is no less 
restrictive means, other than uniform enforcement, to achieve that interest. See, e.g., Dep’t of 
Fair Emp’t & Hous. v. Cathy’s Creations, Inc., BCV-17-102855 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 
Feb. 5, 2018) (exception); Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013); State 
v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543 (Wash. 2017). Thus, political arguments that new state 
RFRAs could be used as a “license to discriminate” against the LGBT community are 
inconsistent with how courts have treated the issue. See Brett Wilkins, Other States 
Considering Arizona-Inspired Anti-gay Bills, DIGITAL J. (Feb. 27, 2014), 
http://www.digitaljournal.com/news/politics/other-states-considering-arizona-inspired 
-anti-gay-bills/article/373441. 
  State RFRAs, then, do not appear to be a good solution for the perceived  
face-off between religious exercise and non-discrimination. Smaller, more focused  
legislative exemptions, such as those enacted in Utah, resolve these questions with greater  
confidence, finality, and respect. See S.B. 296, 61st Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2015); S.B.  
297, 61st Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2015); Dennis Romboy, Utah Anti-bias, Religious  
Rights Law Could Be Model for Other States, DESERET NEWS (Mar. 14, 2015,  
3:30 PM), https://www.deseretnews.com/article/865624241/Utah-anti-bias-religious-
rights-law-could-be-model-for-other-states.html; Robin Fretwell Wilson, Summary  
of the Utah Compromise (Mar. 24, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2584543. Despite this, federal and state RFRAs serve an 
important role in vindicating the free exercise rights of religious minorities because religious 
minorities, lacking political power, are unlikely to successfully be able to petition legislatures 
to enact smaller, focused legislative exemptions for their religious practice. Robin Fretwell 
Wilson, Common Ground Lawmaking: Lessons for Peaceful Coexistence from Masterpiece 
Cakeshop and the Utah Compromise, 51 CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019).  
 122. Sample v. Lappin, 479 F. Supp. 2d 120, 124 (D.D.C. 2007). 
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III. MOVING FORWARD IN RFRA LITIGATION 
Applying RFRA’s “to the person” standard to both the 
compelling interest and least restrictive means analyses should 
reduce the perception that RFRA is a tool of controversy, a sword 
for Christian oppressors,123 or an unsustainable exemption 
regime.124 But to separate RFRA from controversy and produce a 
sustainable RFRA jurisprudence, participants in RFRA litigation, 
whether they be religious claimants, government defendants, or the 
judiciary itself, must fully take the “to the person” language  
into account. 
A. Religious Claimants 
RFRA’s “to the person” language is particularly important for 
religious claimants. Although courts’ due diligence should bring 
the “to the person” language into consideration in all RFRA cases 
that make it past the substantial burden hurdle, plaintiffs should 
invoke the “to the person” standard obviously in their pleadings, 
in oral argument, in briefs, and in any other stage of litigation. 
Shying away from a plaintiff-specific standard allows the 
government to successfully argue broadly asserted compelling 
interests, which, because of their breadth, portend much greater 
harms during litigation than could be possible if the interest were 
narrowed to the plaintiff at hand. Similarly, missing the plaintiff-
specific mark of RFRA’s least restrictive means analysis permits the 
government, in its least restrictive means analysis, to take into 
account the harms and benefits to the population at large—not the 
individualized burden to a religious plaintiff. 
B. Government Defendants 
Rather than asserting unparticularized RFRA arguments, 
government defendants should recognize RFRA’s plaintiff-level 
specificity. In some cases, plaintiff-specific compelling interests 
may be difficult to articulate, and plaintiff-specific least restrictive 
means may be impossible to show. In those cases, the government 
may not win the day. But the government should rest assured that 
 
 123. Goodrich & Busick, supra note 12, at 353. 
 124. Koppelman & Gedicks, supra note 7, at 224. 
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the resulting religious exemption will be as narrow and particular 
as it can be while respecting free exercise. Of course, the 
government will not always lose under RFRA’s “to the person” 
specificity. Indeed, the government should follow cases like 
Christie, Armstrong, Epstein, and Lafley to success. If the current 
administration follows its own guidance, it seems like it will 
employ a plaintiff-specific approach to RFRA litigation.125 
C. The Judiciary 
Analyzing RFRA with “to the person” particularity should be 
in judges’ self-interest. If judges are afraid to grant religious 
exemptions because “[b]ehind every free exercise claim is a spectral 
march; grant this one, a voice whispers to each judge, and you will 
be confronted with an endless chain of exemption demands from 
religious deviants of every stripe,”126 then RFRA’s track record 
since O Centro shows this fear is unfounded. Additionally, the 
reemphasis of the “to the person” language provided by O Centro, 
Hobby Lobby, and other decisions should comfort judges—
instructing (not whispering) that exemptions can be granted to 
particularized plaintiffs so narrowly that a flood of exemption 
claims will not ensue. And even if a flood did ensue, RFRA’s 
statutory burdens would shut out the meritless claims. 
Moreover, strictly applying RFRA’s “to the person” language 
serves another judicial interest: faithfully interpreting statutes by 
their plain meaning.127 Not only does this allow courts to avoid 
mental gymnastics to kick out a possible exemption, but it also 
allows the court to disengage from political controversy—focusing 
on the specificity of RFRA’s standard of proof. And judges’ 
confidence in the end product of RFRA litigation—the narrowest 
exemptions possible to otherwise beneficial legislation—should 
strengthen courts’ resolve to apply RFRA’s obvious “to the  
person” language. 
 
 125. Federal Law Protections for Religious Liberty, 82 Fed. Reg. 49670 (Oct. 26, 2017) 
(“[I]nterests must be evaluated not in broad generalities but as applied to the  
particular adherent.”). 
 126. Where Rights Begin, supra note 12, at 947. 
 127. Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990) (“‘In determining the scope of a 
statute, we look first to its language,’ giving the ‘words used’ their ‘ordinary meaning.’” 
(citations omitted) (first quoting United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981); and then 
quoting Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962))). 
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Thus, judges should demand plaintiff-level “to the person” 
specificity when evaluating RFRA claims, both on the compelling 
interest and least restrictive means considerations. Doing so will 
focus litigation and ensure that RFRA’s original purpose is 
achieved, without disrupting the government’s enforcement of 
otherwise beneficial legislation. Courts should not forget that 
RFRA, like the legislation from which RFRA may grant exemptions, 
was also enacted legislatively. 
CONCLUSION 
Proper application of RFRA’s “to the person” language puts 
fear, controversy, and speculation to rest. This language, and its 
intended effect, was contemplated from the beginning of RFRA. 
After O Centro, Hobby Lobby, and other cases, the “to the person” 
standard has finally been applied as RFRA’s textual blueprint so 
obviously intended: equally and separately to both the compelling 
interest and least restrictive means requirements. This is the basis 
for RFRA’s sustainable exemption framework, which promotes 
narrow accommodations in the interests of all concerned. These 
narrow exemptions simply have not swallowed legislative regimes. 
Rather, RFRA permits religious adherents to live according to their 
faith while allowing Congress’s interests to advance. To sustain 
RFRA’s balance, religious claimants, government defendants, and 
the judiciary must all play their part. Only then may RFRA be 
decoupled from controversy. 
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APPENDIX A 
Federal Appellate Decisions Citing RFRA After O Centro 
Last updated June 13, 2018 
 
Case Name Category 
  
Borzych v. Frank, 439 F.3d 388 (7th Cir. 2006) RLUIPA 
Webman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 441 F.3d 
1022 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 
Non-TTP 
Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 
1036 (7th Cir. 2006) 
Non-TTP 
Guru Nanak Sikh Soc. of Yuba City v. Cty. of 
Sutter, 456 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2006) 
RLUIPA 
 
Vill. of Bensenville v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 457 
F.3d 52 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 
Non-TTP 
Madison v. Virginia, 474 F.3d 118 (4th Cir. 
2006) 
RLUIPA 
Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 479 F.3d 
1024 (9th Cir. 2007) 
TTP 
Spratt v. Rhode Island Dep’t Of Corr., 482 F.3d 
33 (1st Cir. 2007) 
RLUIPA 
San Juan Cty., Utah v. United States, 503 F.3d 
1163 (10th Cir. 2007) 
Non-TTP 
Francis v. Mineta, 505 F.3d 266 (3d Cir. 2007) Non-TTP 
Longoria v. Dretke, 507 F.3d 898 (5th Cir. 2007) RLUIPA 
Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2007) TTP 
Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of 
Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2007) 
RLUIPA 
 
United States v. Zimmerman, 514 F.3d 851 (9th 
Cir. 2007) 
Non-TTP 
Fernandez v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 553 (9th Cir. 
2008) 
Substantial Burden 
Rasul v. Myers, 512 F.3d 644 (D.C. Cir. 2008) Non-TTP 
Greene v. Solano Cty. Jail, 513 F.3d 982 (9th 
Cir. 2008) 
RLUIPA 
Patel v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 515 F.3d 807 
(8th Cir. 2008) 
Substantial Burden 
Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 
2008) 
Non-TTP 
Fernandez v. Mukasey, 520 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 
2008) 
Substantial Burden 
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United States v. Vasquez-Ramos, 522 F.3d 914 
(9th Cir. 2008) 
TTP 
Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 2008) RLUIPA 
Larsen v. U.S. Navy, 525 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 
2008) 
Non-TTP 




United States v. Vasquez-Ramos, 531 F.3d 987 
(9th Cir. 2008) 
TTP 
Fowler v. Crawford, 534 F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 
2008) 
RLUIPA 
Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 
1058 (9th Cir. 2008) 
Substantial Burden 
Fegans v. Norris, 537 F.3d 897 (8th Cir. 2008) RLUIPA 
Combs v. Homer-Ctr. Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 231 
(3d Cir. 2008) 
Non-TTP 
Olsen v. Mukasey, 541 F.3d 827 (8th Cir. 2008) Non-TTP 
Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. F.E.R.C., 545 F.3d 
1207 (9th Cir. 2008) 
Substantial Burden 
St. John’s United Church of Christ v. F.A.A., 550 
F.3d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
Non-TTP 
Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669 (D.C. Cir. 
2008) 
TTP 
Carroll Coll., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 558 F.3d 568 
(D.C. Cir. 2009) 
Non-TTP 
Potter v. D.C., 558 F.3d 542 (D.C. Cir. 2009) TTP 
Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009) Non-TTP 
Merced v. Kasson, 577 F.3d 578 (5th Cir. 2009) RLUIPA, Non-TTP 
Jama v. Esmor Corr. Servs., Inc., 577 F.3d 169 
(3d Cir. 2009) 
Non-TTP 
S. Fork Band Council Of W. Shoshone Of Nevada 




Newdow v. Lefevre, 598 F.3d 638 (9th Cir. 2010) Non-TTP 
A.A. ex rel. Betenbaugh v. Needville Indep. Sch. 
Dist., 611 F.3d 248 (5th Cir. 2010) 
Non-TTP 
 
Boardley v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 615 F.3d 508 
(D.C. Cir. 2010) 
Non-TTP 
Gen. Conference Corp. of Seventh-Day 
Adventists v. McGill, 617 F.3d 402 (6th Cir. 
2010) 
Non-TTP 
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United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274 (10th 
Cir. 2011) 
TTP 
Harrell v. Donahue, 638 F.3d 975 (8th Cir. 
2011) 
Non-TTP 
Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277 (2011) RLUIPA 
Mahoney v. Doe, 642 F.3d 1112 (D.C. Cir. 2011) Substantial Burden 
United States v. Lafley, 656 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 
2011) 
TTP 
Guttman v. Khalsa, 669 F.3d 1101 (10th Cir. 
2012) 
Non-TTP 
Walden v. Centers for Disease Control & 
Prevention, 669 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2012) 
Non-TTP, Substantial 
Burden, TTP 
Oklevueha Native Am. Church of Hawaii, Inc. v. 
Holder, 676 F.3d 829 (9th Cir. 2012) 
Non-TTP 
Johnson v. Killian, 680 F.3d 234 (2d Cir. 2012) Non-TTP 
United States v. Ali, 682 F.3d 705 (8th Cir. 
2012) 
Non-TTP 
Opulent Life Church v. City of Holly Springs, 
Miss., 697 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2012) 
RLUIPA 
 
Ruiz-Diaz v. United States, 703 F.3d 483 (9th 
Cir. 2012) 
Substantial Burden 
Wheaton Coll. v. Sebelius, 703 F.3d 551 (D.C. 
Cir. 2012) 
Non-TTP 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 568 U.S. 
1401 (2012) 
Non-TTP 
Grote v. Sebelius, 708 F.3d 850 (7th Cir. 2013) Substantial Burden 
Garner v. Kennedy, 713 F.3d 237 (5th Cir. 2013) RLUIPA 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 
1114 (10th Cir. 2013) 
TTP  
Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Lew, 733 F.3d 72 (4th Cir. 
2013) 
Substantial Burden 
Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield v. City of 
Springfield, 724 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2013) 
RLUIPA 
 
Knight v. Thompson, 723 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 
2013) 
RLUIPA 
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of 
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 724 F.3d 
377 (3d Cir. 2013) 
Non-TTP 
 
Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618 (6th 
Cir. 2013) 
Non-TTP 
Eden Foods, Inc. v. Sebelius, 733 F.3d 626 (6th 
Cir. 2013) 
Non-TTP 
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Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
733 F.3d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 2013) 
Non-TTP 
 
Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2013) TTP 
Tagore v. United States, 735 F.3d 324 (5th Cir. 
2013) 
TTP 
In re McGough, 737 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 2013) Non-TTP 
Aamer v. Obama, 742 F.3d 1023 (D.C. Cir. 
2014) 
Non-TTP 
Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, 743 F.3d 547 
(7th Cir. 2014) 
Non-TTP 
Newdow v. Peterson, 753 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 
2014) 
Substantial Burden 
Michigan Catholic Conference & Catholic Family 
Servs. v. Burwell, 755 F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 2014) 
Substantial Burden 
 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 
2751 (2014) 
TTP 
Eternal Word Television Network, Inc. v. Sec’y, 
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 756 F.3d 
1339 (11th Cir. 2014) 
Non-TTP 
 
Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806 (2014) Non-TTP 
Bormes v. United States, 759 F.3d 793 (7th Cir. 
2014) 
Non-TTP 
Haight v. Thompson, 763 F.3d 554 (6th Cir. 
2014) 
RLUIPA 
McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Salazar, 764 
F.3d 465 (5th Cir. 2014) 
TTP 
O’Brien v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 766 F.3d 862 (8th Cir. 2014) 
Non-TTP 
Annex Med., Inc. v. Burwell, 769 F.3d 578 (8th 
Cir. 2014) 
Non-TTP 
Priests For Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 




Davila v. Gladden, 777 F.3d 1198 (11th Cir. 
2015) 
TTP 
Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015) RLUIPA 
Geneva Coll. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., 778 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2015) 
Substantial Burden 
 
Listecki v. Official Comm. of Unsecured 
Creditors, 780 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2015) 
Non-TTP 
Univ. of Notre Dame v. Burwell, 786 F.3d 606 
(7th Cir. 2015) 
Non-TTP 
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Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 808 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2015) 
Non-TTP 
 
Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 791 F.3d 792 (7th Cir. 
2015) 
Non-TTP 
Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged, 




Wieland v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 793 F.3d 949 (8th Cir. 2015) 
Non-TTP 
Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064 (9th 
Cir. 2015) 
Non-TTP 
Knight v. Thompson, 797 F.3d 934 (11th Cir. 
2015) 
RLUIPA 
Catholic Health Care Sys. v. Burwell, 796 F.3d 
207 (2d Cir. 2015) 
Substantial Burden 
Grace Sch. v. Burwell, 801 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 
2015) 
Substantial Burden 
Sharpe Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., 801 F.3d 927 (8th Cir. 2015) 
TTP 
Dordt Coll. v. Burwell, 801 F.3d 946 (8th Cir. 
2015) 
Substantial Burden 
E. Texas Baptist Univ. v. Burwell, 807 F.3d 630 
(5th Cir. 2015) 
Substantial Burden  
Eternal Word Television Network, Inc. v. Sec’y of 
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 818 F.3d 
1122 (11th Cir. 2016) 
Substantial Burden 
 
Oklevueha Native Am. Church Of Hawaii, Inc. v. 
Lynch, 828 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2016) 
Substantial Burden 
 
United States v. Christie, 825 F.3d 1048 (9th 
Cir. 2016) 
TTP 
Mack v. Warden Loretto FCI, 839 F.3d 286 (3d 
Cir. 2016) 
Substantial Burden 
United States v. Comrie, 842 F.3d 348 (5th Cir. 
2016) 
Non-TTP 
United States v. Anderson, 854 F.3d 1033 (8th 
Cir. 2017) 
TTP 
Ghailani v. Sessions, 859 F.3d 1295 (10th Cir. 
2017) 
TTP 
United States v. Stimler, 864 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 
2017) 
Substantial Burden  
Real Alternatives, Inc. v. Sec’y Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., 867 F.3d 338 (3d Cir. 2017) 
Substantial Burden 
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Islamic Ctr. of Nashville v. Tennessee, 872 F.3d 
377 (6th Cir. 2017) 
Non-TTP 
Am. Humanist Ass’n v. Maryland-Nat’l Capital 
Park & Planning Comm’n, No. 15-2597, 2018 
WL 2400763 (4th Cir. Mar. 1, 2018) 
Non-TTP 
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. R.G. 
&. G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 
560 (6th Cir. 2018) 
Substantial Burden, 
TTP 
Penn v. New York Methodist Hosp., 884 F.3d 
416 (2d Cir. 2018) 
Non-TTP 
Tanvir v. Tanzin, 889 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2018) Non-TTP 
New Doe Child #1 v. Cong. of United States, No. 
16-4345, 2018 WL 2410806 (6th Cir. May 29, 
2018) 
Substantial Burden 
Mayle v. United States, No. 17-3221, 2018 WL 
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APPENDIX B 
“To the Person” Cases in Federal Courts After O Centro 
Last updated June 13, 2018 
 
Case Name Category 
  
Sample v. Lappin, 424 F. Supp. 2d 187 (D.D.C. 2006) TTP w/ CI 
& LRM 
Redhead v. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 440 F. 
Supp. 2d 211 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) 
TTP w/ CI 
Only 
Sample v. Lappin, 479 F. Supp. 2d 120 (D.D.C. 2007) TTP w/ CI 
Only 
Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2007) TTP w/ CI 
& LRM 
United States v. Adeyemo, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (N.D. 
Cal. 2008) 
TTP w/ CI 
& LRM 
United States v. Vasquez-Ramos, 531 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 
2008) 
TTP w/ CI 
& LRM 
Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669 (D.C. Cir. 2008) TTP w/ CI 
& LRM 
Forde v. Baird, 720 F. Supp. 2d 170 (D. Conn. 2010) TTP w/ CI 
& LRM 
United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274 (10th Cir. 2011) TTP w/ CI 
& LRM 
United States v. Lafley, 656 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2011) TTP w/ CI 
& LRM 
Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (D. Colo. 2012) TTP w/ CI 
& LRM 
Legatus v. Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980 (E.D. Mich. 2012) TTP w/ CI 
& LRM 
Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 
106 (D.D.C. 2012) 
TTP w/ CI 
Only 
Monaghan v. Sebelius, 916 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D. Mich. 
2012) 
TTP w/ CI 
Only 
Geneva Coll. v. Sebelius, 929 F. Supp. 2d 402 (W.D. Pa. 
2013) 
TTP w/ CI 
Only 
Monaghan v. Sebelius, 931 F. Supp. 2d 794 (E.D. Mich. 
2013) 
TTP w/ CI 
& LRM 
Geneva Coll. v. Sebelius, 941 F. Supp. 2d 672 (W.D. Pa. 
2013) 
TTP w/ CI 
& LRM 
Geneva Coll. v. Sebelius, 960 F. Supp. 2d 588 (W.D. Pa. 
2013) 
TTP w/ CI 
Only 
001.BEAN_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/15/19  1:56 PM 
1 "To the Person”: RFRA’s Blueprint 
 39 
Beckwith Elec. Co. v. Sebelius, 960 F. Supp. 2d 1328 (M.D. 
Fla. 2013) 
TTP w/ CI 
Only 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th 
Cir. 2013) 
TTP w/ CI 
& LRM 
Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2013) TTP w/ CI 
& LRM 
Tagore v. United States, 735 F.3d 324 (5th Cir. 2013) TTP w/ CI 
& LRM 
Zubik v. Sebelius, 983 F. Supp. 2d 576 (W.D. Pa. 2013) TTP w/ CI 
Only 
Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New York v. Sebelius, 987 F. 
Supp. 2d 232 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) 
TTP w/ CI 
& LRM 
Legatus v. Sebelius, 988 F. Supp. 2d 794 (E.D. Mich. 2013) TTP w/ CI 
& LRM 
Diocese of Fort Wayne-S. Bend, Inc. v. Sebelius, 988 F. 
Supp. 2d 958 (N.D. Ind. 2013) 
TTP w/ CI 
Only 
E. Texas Baptist Univ. v. Sebelius, 988 F. Supp. 2d 743 
(S.D. Tex. 2013) 
TTP w/ CI 
Only 
Catholic Diocese of Beaumont v. Sebelius, 10 F. Supp. 3d 
725 (E.D. Tex. 2014) 
TTP w/ CI 
Only 
Ave Maria Found. v. Sebelius, 991 F. Supp. 2d 957 (E.D. 
Mich. 2014) 
TTP w/ CI 
Only 
Dobson v. Sebelius, 38 F. Supp. 3d 1245 (D. Colo. 2014) TTP w/ CI 
Only 
Colorado Christian Univ. v. Sebelius, 51 F. Supp. 3d 1052 
(D. Colo. 2014) 
TTP w/ CI 
Only 
Archdiocese of St. Louis v. Burwell, 28 F. Supp. 3d 944 
(E.D. Mo. 2014) 
TTP w/ CI 
& LRM 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) TTP w/ CI 
& LRM 
Louisiana Coll. v. Sebelius, 38 F. Supp. 3d 766 (W.D. La. 
2014) 
TTP w/ CI 
& LRM 
McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Salazar, 764 F.3d 465 
(5th Cir. 2014) 
TTP w/ CI 
& LRM 
Catholic Benefits Ass’n LCA v. Burwell, 81 F. Supp. 3d 
1269 (W.D. Okla. 2014) 
TTP w/ CI 
Only 
Davila v. Gladden, 777 F.3d 1198 (11th Cir. 2015) TTP w/ CI 
& LRM 
Sch. of the Ozarks, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 86 F. Supp. 3d 1066 (W.D. Mo. 2015) 
TTP w/ CI 
& LRM 
N. Arapaho Tribe v. Ashe, 92 F. Supp. 3d 1160 (D. Wyo. 
2015) 
TTP w/ CI 
& LRM 
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United States v. Epstein, 91 F. Supp. 3d 573 (D.N.J. 2015) TTP w/ CI 
& LRM 
Singh v. McHugh, 109 F. Supp. 3d 72 (D.D.C. 2015) TTP w/ CI 
& LRM 
Mar. for Life v. Burwell, 128 F. Supp. 3d 116 (D.D.C. 
2015) 
TTP w/ CI 
& LRM 
Sharpe Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 801 F.3d 927 (8th Cir. 2015) 
TTP w/ CI 
& LRM 
Armstrong v. Jewell, 151 F. Supp. 3d 242 (D.R.I. 2015) TTP w/ CI 
& LRM 
Real Alternatives, Inc. v. Burwell, 150 F. Supp. 3d 419 
(M.D. Pa. 2015) 
TTP w/ CI 
& LRM 
Real Alternatives, Inc. v. Burwell, 150 F. Supp. 3d 419 
(M.D. Pa. 2015) 
TTP w/ CI 
& LRM 
United States v. Girod, 159 F. Supp. 3d 773 (E.D. Ky. 
2015) 
TTP w/ CI 
Only 
Eternal Word Television Network, Inc. v. Sec’y of U.S. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 818 F.3d 1122 (11th Cir. 
2016) 
TTP w/ CI 
& LRM  
Singh v. McHugh, 185 F. Supp. 3d 201 (D.D.C. 2016) TTP w/ CI 
& LRM 
United States v. Christie, 825 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2016) TTP w/ CI 
& LRM 
Wieland v. United States Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
196 F. Supp. 3d 1010 (E.D. Mo. 2016) 
TTP w/ CI 
& LRM 
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. R.G. & G.R. 
Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 837 (E.D. 
Mich. 2016) 
TTP w/ CI 
& LRM  
Franciscan All., Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d 660 (N.D. 
Tex. 2016) 
TTP w/ CI 
& LRM 
United States v. Anderson, 854 F.3d 1033 (8th Cir. 2017) TTP w/ CI 
& LRM 
Ghailani v. Sessions, 859 F.3d 1295 (10th Cir. 2017) TTP w/ CI 
& LRM 
O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal v. Duke, 
286 F. Supp. 3d 1239 (D.N.M. 2017) 
TTP w/ CI 
& LRM 
 
